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Piet van der Ploeg and Laurence Guérin
QUESTIONING PARTICIPATION AND SOLIDARITY
AS GOALS OF CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION
ABSTRACT:According to many governments and educationalists, education should
aim to develop dispositions conducive to political participation and solidarity,
because democratic citizenship presupposes participation and solidarity. But there
are radically different views on the nature of good citizenship. We examine the
implications of this dissensus for citizenship education. Education, we contend,
should involve and develop autonomy and open-mindedness. We argue that this
requires a more critical approach than is possible when political participation and
solidarity are conceived of as goals of education.
Keywords: citizenship; civic education; democracy; participation; solidarity; service learning.
In recent decades, citizenship education has attracted a great deal of posi-
tive attention. It is seen as a cure for what is thought to ail democracy: lack
of participation and lack of solidarity. It is thought that there is too much
indifference towards politics, toward social issues, and toward the
common good; and insufﬁcient social connectedness and concern for
others’ welfare. The remedy, it is thought, is for children to develop dis-
positions conducive to participation and solidarity in school (e.g., Coley
and Sum ; De Winter ; Lautzenheiser et al. ; National
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Conference on Citizenship ; Torney-Purta and Vermeer Lopez
). This view has been quite inﬂuential in citizenship education
policy in the United States and Europe (Crick ; Eurydice ;
Hoskins et al. ; Kerr et al. ).
First, we shall argue that the concerns about democracy which motiv-
ate the attention for citizenship education are highly contestable. There
are radically different views about the merits of political participation
and solidarity. We shall then consider the educational consequences of
this dissensus: what do the differences of perception and opinion mean
for citizenship education?
Autonomy and Open-Mindedness
A prominent debate on citizenship education in the s, taking place at
the intersection of political philosophy and the philosophy of education,
focused on whether the government in a liberal democracy should ensure
that all children are provided with an education that develops autonomy
and open-mindedness. Advocates of the idea that the government does
indeed have this obligation emphasized the importance of autonomy
and open-mindedness for democratic citizenship. They argued that no
one would be in a position to practice democratic citizenship without
self-determination and without critical judgment, responsive to relevant
evidence and arguments. Everyone, therefore, ought to have these
characteristics, and contributing to this goal, it was argued, is a crucial
objective of education for democratic citizenship (e.g., Brighouse ;
Gutmann  and ; Levinson ).
Those who were on the other side of this debate pointed out the
illiberal nature of their opponents’ (liberal) view. To apotheosize self-
determination and critical judgment, they contended, is to assume that
a liberal conception of the good life is better than alternative conceptions,
jeopardizing the traditional liberal ideal of state neutrality among
conceptions of the good. A truly liberal democracy, then, ought to
respect the freedom of parents to allow their offspring to be educated
in accordance with their convictions, even if these clash with liberal
convictions. Therefore, the government in a liberal democracy should
not impose compulsory education that aims to develop autonomy and
open-mindedness (e.g., Galston ; Kukathas ; Stolzenberg ;
Tamir ; Tomasi ).





























In this discussion we, as educational philosophers, will assume that the
government may impose education involving and developing autonomy
and open-mindedness (van der Ploeg ). The classic principle that
education should involve and develop autonomy and open-mindedness
need not be based on political or social convictions, but can be inspired
by an understanding of the nature of learning and a knowledge of didac-
tics, child development, motivation, cognition, and interaction. Indeed, it
is a truism supported by various traditions, such as the pragmatism of John
Dewey () and Boyd H. Bode (), the liberal and analytical tra-
dition of (for instance) Richard Peters () and Israel Schefﬂer (),
the German Geisteswissenschaftliche tradition of (for instance) Theodor
Ballauff () and Dietrich Benner (), and Self-Determination
Theory (Deci and Ryan ). Our view, however, is that fostering
political participation and solidarity through education is at odds with
the development of autonomy and open-mindedness.
Social Engineering
In an article in , the British political theorist Sir Bernard Crick quoted
the mission statement of the well-known Crick report published ten years
earlier (the  report of an independent British advisory group chaired
by Crick himself):
We aim at no less than a change in the political culture of this country both
nationally and locally: for people to think of themselves as active citizens,
willing, able and equipped to have an inﬂuence in public life and with the
critical capacities to weigh evidence before speaking and acting; to build on
and to extend radically to young people the best in existing traditions of
community involvement and to make them individually conﬁdent in
ﬁnding new forms of involvement and action among themselves.
(Quoted in Crick , )
This sounds rather idealistic and ideological. In hindsight, however, Crick
did not beat around the bush: “The inarticulate major premise or presup-
position of the report as written was . . . civic republicanism” (ibid., ).
Crick acknowledges the presence of the bias, but obviously does not see it
as a problem.
This bias is not exclusively British; policies elsewhere in Europe and in
the United States have similar goals (Eurydice ; Hoskins et al. ;
Kerr et al. ; Murphy ). Whether labelled republican or liberal (cf.





























Abowitz and Harnish ; Carr ; Hoskins et al. ; Kymlicka and
Norman ; Zimenkova ), the bias is still a bias, and that is a
problem.
Our concerns are along the lines of the criticism voiced by, among
others, Tatjana Zimenkova (), Reinhold Hedtke (), and Detlef
Sack (). In chapters in Education for Civic and Political Participation
(Hedtke and Zimenkova ), they criticize what have become the
dominant objectives of citizenship education because they presuppose a
nonexistent “consensus of goals and wishful contents of citizenship edu-
cation” (Zimenkova , ). According to this assumed consensus, citi-
zenship education should focus on conventional virtues, duties, practices,
and procedures, such as voting in elections, cooperating, helping one
another, tolerating one another, respecting others’ views and lifestyles,
deliberating and persuading, knowing and practicing one’s rights; in this
way, it will encourage political participation and social cohesion. But
such a consensus would ignore less obedient, less harmonious, and less
conformist kinds of activism, involvement, and solidarity, such as agita-
tion, conﬂict, protest, subversion, and commitment to one’s cause.
Instead, the primary objective is “the ‘smooth’ running of democracy”
(ibid., ).
According to Zimenkova, Hedtke, and Sack, the dominant ambition is
not only “emancipative activation” but “social engineering” (Sack ).
It is fueled by concerns about declining political participation, declining
faith in public bodies and institutions, the erosion of social cohesion
and civil society, and ongoing social and cultural segregation. All of
these worries are couched as shortcomings of the populace: “A deﬁcit is
diagnosed on the side of the citizens” (Hedtke , ). In which case
the remedy would seem obvious: Citizens should learn to participate,
appropriately, by showing solidarity and being accommodating. Hedtke
calls this perspective “political and societal functionalism” (ibid., ).
He calls the idea that citizenship education has a role in contributing to
the proper functioning of politics and society “educational functionalism”
(ibid., ). According to this view, education should be used
for the production of a more or less predeﬁned set of individual attitudes,
competencies and behaviour expected to secure that kind of support of a
political system which is perceived as necessary for its persistence or devel-
opment. . . . Citizenship education runs the risk of being downgraded to





























the individual acquisition of civic competencies as a process of socialisation
into the existing polity and society. (Ibid., , )
Following Foucault, Sack (, –) discusses this functionalism in
terms of “governmentality”: Citizenship education should mold citizens’
“conduct” and “mindset”; it should foster “self-governance” while at the
same time teaching a “certain mentality,” a combination of speciﬁc “per-
ceptions, attitudes and appraisals.” In this way, according to Zimenkova,
Hedtke, and Sack, education afﬁrms the prevailing political and social phi-
losophical ideology. Their alternative is for citizenship education to be
more open-minded towards citizens’ “activism,” with more attention
and approval of conﬂict. Rather than being exclusively liberal and repub-
lican, it would offer scope for agonistic perspectives (e.g., those adum-
brated by Badiou  and Mouffe ).
Others have also criticized the dominant view of citizenship education
because of its repression of agonistic perspectives (e.g., Börhaug ;
Pérez Expósito ; Ruitenberg  and ; Stitzlein ; Straume
). But while their objection to the one-sidedness of contemporary
citizenship education is warranted, their alternative is itself one-sided, as
it lacks open-mindedness towards the option of non-participation.
Non-Participative Citizenship
In its dominant mode, citizenship education teaches that non-partici-
pation is an unacceptable option. Nor only is non-participation by
choice or as a way of life not presented as a feasible and equally valuable
variant of citizenship; it is presented as an unsuitable option. By impli-
cation, it treats as illegitimate the view that there is not necessarily a dis-
crepancy between good citizenship and living one’s life for oneself.
An example of a philosopher who represents this outlook is Jason
Brennan ( and ). We shall reconstruct his viewpoint.
According to Brennan, the quality of democracy is not dependent on
the level of political participation of all citizens for three reasons. First,
although it is true that democracy cannot exist when no one participates,
it can well exist without everyone participating. Likewise, if no one were
to grow grain, there would be no bread and no beer. We would not want
this to happen. But it does not follow that everyone should grow grain. It
sufﬁces that some people grow grain. The same applies to participation
and democracy. Second, democracy does not become more effective





























when more citizens participate. There is no empirical evidence that the
quality of government or the welfare of a people is dependent on the
number of participating citizens. The available research data suggest that
there is no such correlation, or, conversely, that there is a correlation,
but that participation is dependent on the prosperity and welfare of a
people and also on the quality of government, not the other way
around. Third, democracy does not become more legitimate when
more citizens participate. If many citizens voluntarily relinquish their
say because they have faith in other citizens’ judgment, the legitimacy
of government is not diminished. The quality of democracy is therefore
not dependent on the quantity of participation.
Neither, Brennan believes, is political participation a condition of good
citizenship. He criticizes the tendency to conceive of civic virtue solely in
a political sense. Deﬁning civic virtue as something like “the disposition to
promote the common good . . . over purely private ends” Brennan (,
) emphasizes that citizens are able to exercise this virtue in a variety of
ways, not all of which must be intentional and involve political commit-
ment. Civic virtue might also be achieved through activities of a non-pol-
itical nature or without having the common good in mind. Many citizens,
he argues, contribute to the common good by conscientiously going
about their daily work. The division of labor provides for an “extended
system of social cooperation” (ibid., ) that, in turn, supplies the “back-
ground conditions of wealth, opportunity, and cultural progress” (ibid.,
). Hence Brennan’s conclusion:
There are many ways to be a good citizen. Some of these ways are the
stereotypical republican ones: voting well, campaigning, pushing for insti-
tutional improvements, or engaging in . . . political service. But many
activities stereotypically considered private, such as being a conscientious
employee, making art, running a for-proﬁt business, or pursuing scientiﬁc
discoveries, can also be exercises of civic virtue. For many people, in fact,
these are better ways to exercise civic virtue. (Ibid., )
There are, of course, many possible objections to Brennan’s arguments.
But however convincing the counterarguments may be, Brennan’s
position is reasonable enough to warrant the conclusion that the back-
ground assumptions of contemporary citizenship education are contro-
versial. The same applies with respect to social involvement.
Philosophers like Brennan are of the opinion that a decline in social
involvement does not present much of a problem: Society does not





























necessarily become more benevolent when more people are afﬁliated
with societies and organizations or when social relationships are more
close-knit. Many see it as a cause for concern that society has become
more individualistic and that traditional social relations are eroding. A
thriving “civil society” and a large amount of “social capital” are
deemed to be vitally important, at both a social and personal level, but
we have less and less of this, or so the story goes (e.g., Putnam ).
Brennan objects by pointing out that freedom contributes to personal
well-being, and that community spirit and a close-knit civil society can
infringe on freedom and therefore on personal well-being. He also
argues that individual freedom has favorable social effects and that a
close-knit civil society has adverse social effects. When people are given
ample scope to attend to their own affairs, go about their daily work,
live their lives, and mind their own business, solidarity can be a side effect.
Consider artists, entrepreneurs, small-business owners, venture capitalists,
teachers, physicians, intellectuals, stock traders, stay-at-home parents,
working parents, chefs, janitors, grocery clerks, and others. Each of these
kinds of people in one way or another contributes to fostering a worth-
while society. They each help create the bundle of goods others in their
society receive. . . .They help create the common good of a well-function-
ing liberal society, of the background conditions of opportunity and wealth
that make it so that other citizens’ lives go so well. (Brennan , )
The importance of social involvement is therefore as controversial as the
importance of political participation. Yet the dominant view of citizenship
education treats views such as Brennan’s as if they did not exist. Once again,
it may be that the agonistic or the non-participative view are inferior to the
dominant view. For our argument it sufﬁces that the arguments brought
forward in support of the two alternative points of view are reasonable.
Doing Justice to Diversity
Education should do justice to this diversity.
Up to a point, this occurs automatically. In school the younger gener-
ation develops some of the knowledge, skills, and attitudes required in
order to live in a modern society, including life as a citizen. It is the
place where children, for instance, learn to read and write and where
they acquire knowledge about nature and history. At the same time,
they learn to deal with authority and rules, to consider others, to take





























initiative, to ask themselves questions, and so on. At this fundamental level
and in this general sense, school education is citizenship education. In
principle, it can do equal justice to all views about what good citizenship
is. For any conception of good citizenship will require some degree of
sociability, initiative, reﬂectiveness, and judgmental skill.
Understood in this way, education is integrally and inherently citizen-
ship education. However, the dominant view ﬁnds elementary solidarity
inadequate. It expects more of students than the ability to exhibit con-
sideration for others in the classroom. They believe that education
should also be committed to teaching social virtues. Dispositions such as
solidarity, loyalty, and helpfulness should be practiced and presented to
students as important virtues. Our objection is that this approach is
inspired by a single understanding of good citizenship. It comes at the
expense of competing understandings.
When education fails to do justice to diversity of thought it is indoc-
trinatory (Callan and Arena ), and this not as it should be. We take
as our starting point the idea that education should develop autonomy
and open-mindedness on the part of the learner. When differences of per-
ception, understanding, and opinion remain concealed from students,
they are not encouraged to discover, compare, and evaluate different
ideas; they get to know only one of many possible perspectives and, fur-
thermore, they learn to take this one outlook for granted. They are not
encouraged to make up their own minds; on the contrary, their ability
to make their own judgements and decisions is stiﬂed.
The question we now face is whether there is an alternative that would
steer clear of indoctrination while doing more to facilitate citizenship than
merely developing elementary competencies. We believe that the only
such alternative is to make a variety of perspectives on citizenship part
of the subject matter of education.
Indoctrination begins once one allows a speciﬁc view of citizenship—a bias
—to determine the norms of education. Such a bias cannot be prevented
simply by allowing, in the abstract, that alternative views of good citizenship
may be normative, even while one norm alone is enacted in the classroom.
However, various views may be the subject matter of education. This offers a
starting point for an “objective” approach to citizenship education.
Our image of an objective approach to citizenship education is as
follows. Either concentrated in a separate school subject or spread out
over various school subjects such as history, economics, and social
studies (or in a combination of spreading and concentrating), students





























should acquire an understanding of conﬂicting perspectives on citizenship.
In order to gain more insight into these perspectives, they can (depending
on age and aptitude) also become acquainted with various underlying
ideologies and traditions and with the historical and social backgrounds
of those differences, and familiarized with current discussions on citizen-
ship and the arguments that play a part in such discussions. Citizenship
education, conceived in this way, does justice to all perspectives and
accomplishes the opposite of indoctrination. The student develops the
competency to explore and compare perspectives on good citizenship,
to appreciate them, and also to assess which view is the most convincing
and is best suited to her. In this way, she develops the capacity to deter-
mine for herself how to realize her citizenship.
Citizenship education, in this sense, obviously ties in with the
knowledge, skills, and attitudes developed in other parts of education,
seeing as it is dependent on these. Not only does it build on elementary
competencies, but also on such subjects as history and economics. Citizen-
ship might even form a continuing subject throughout the entire primary
and secondary education program, perhaps initially being part of various
different learning areas and school subjects and ultimately becoming an
independent subject for one or two years.
We shall now illustrate the difference between our proposal and the
dominant conception of citizenship education on the basis of three
themes. For the ﬁrst illustration, we return to Bernard Crick.
Service Learning
In secondary education, service learning is an important method of citi-
zenship education. Students engage in activities outside the classroom
that address human and community needs. Crick warns us, however, that
service learning can only be true citizenship education when certain con-
ditions are met. As an example he speaks of a class of sixteen-year-olds
that organized a musical gathering for the ladies in a home for the elderly.
Now that was . . . perhaps “good citizenship” but not by itself politically
literate “active citizenship.” The party for the old people could well
have been a ﬁtting culmination or celebration of a prior process of
setting out to discover something of the complicated interrelations and
policies of the local authority personal social services, the National
Health Service, government departments, and the voluntary charitable
sector. But that was completely lacking: no preparatory class work or





























knowledge-based follow up afterwards. So the students had no informed
basis on which to ask why were some of the old people “in a home”
and not able to be cared for at home? The students could then have
formed some view of how well the arrangements work, what is public
policy and perhaps even how it could be improved. The pupils might
even have made, as if real citizens, a representation to one or more of
the relevant authorities. Some aspects of all that (admittedly one of the
most complex of national problems) would surely count as learning for
active citizenship, not just the moral motivation and the feel-good value
to the individuals involved. (Crick , )
Crick is quite right. When service learning concentrates on promoting
dispositions without these being embedded in a curriculum in which
knowledge and skills, including critical inquiry and judgment, are given
ample attention, then it misses the mark as citizenship education:
A knowledge base was needed before the real situation could be under-
stood; and skills of presentation and advocacy were needed if they then
had wished to make representations on the basis both of what they
found out and what they saw. So a political education in a democracy
must be a mixture of knowledge and skills as well as discussion of real
issues revealing and clarifying values. (Ibid.)
However, we do not think that Crick is critical enough. He views
knowledge and skills as prerequisites of learning to be politically active
and socially involved. He fails to appreciate that students also require
knowledge and skills, including inquiry and judgment skills, in order to
make rational assessments regarding the degree to which they wish to
be politically active and socially involved. The development of knowl-
edge and skills and the practice in critical inquiry and judgment should
not be subservient to learning how to participate and advocate. That
would be indoctrinatory. Education should equip students in such a way
as to allow them to reason and determine for themselves what kind of citi-
zens they want to be and how they wish to practice their citizenship.
Political Efﬁcacy
Citizenship education should not be organized in such a way as to lead
students to believe that only speciﬁc forms and degrees of participation
and solidarity are appropriate or desirable as an embodiment of citizen-
ship, and to shape their behavior accordingly. For a second illustration





























of what we mean by this, we turn to political efﬁcacy. The feeling of
political efﬁcacy, or conﬁdence in one’s own political power (“I can
make a difference”), is often advocated as a primary objective of citizen-
ship education (e.g., Schulz et al. ), because it inﬂuences political par-
ticipation. This emerges from empirical research (e.g., Niemi et al. ),
but it is also rather obvious: greater conﬁdence in one’s own ability to
make a difference motivates attempts to make a difference. The edu-
cational conclusion seems a simple one: by increasing political efﬁcacy,
education can promote political participation.
A common way of attempting to increase political efﬁcacy through
education is learning by doing: students conduct activities that resemble
political pursuits, such as service learning, student councils, and classroom
debates. Through such activities students experience at ﬁrst hand that they
can make a contribution and that something positive can come out of this.
We have some hesitations concerning political efﬁcacy as an edu-
cational goal, because we believe that education has a different function
with respect to political efﬁcacy than merely to promote it. The edu-
cational norm of developing autonomy and open-mindedness (the prin-
ciple of non-indoctrination) implies that students must learn to judge their
political competence and its effects under varying conditions realistically.
Situational and realistic judgment is more beﬁtting to autonomy and
open-mindedness than is the simple belief that one can make a difference,
because sometimes one cannot make a difference. Thus, students might
beneﬁt from learning that good intentions and strong commitment can
founder when confronted with structural impediments and can run
aground in procedural shambles. Joseph Kahne and Joel Westheimer
() correctly point out that this ought not to be an unintended and
unforeseen effect of project learning. It should be an educational objective
to gain a realistic picture of what is possible. We believe that in order to do
so, students must acquire knowledge of the relationship between politics
and society, of power relationships within society, of social conﬂicts, of
dynamics within and among institutions, of policy making and bureauc-
racy, and of conﬂicting views about these topics. Such knowledge fosters
their assessment of what kind of citizens they wish to be and how to
realize their citizenship in practice. Gaining this knowledge is not possible
without an education in which the students can themselves investigate
and assess the differences between perspectives on citizenship.






























In line with the previous argument, we think it is educational malpractice
to attempt to boost political efﬁcacy by giving students the impression that
political participation always or usually helps. What education should not
do, for instance, is to mislead students into thinking that it is always
worthwhile for everyone to vote.
In the run-up to the American presidential elections in , we
received through the Civic Education mailing list of the American Politi-
cal Science Association (APSA) various practical recommendations on
how we might stimulate students in higher education to vote; or as
some put it: “Helping students surmount political cynicism.” In this
context Paul Loeb, Alexander Astin, and Parker Palmer () urged edu-
cators to
provide a rationale for why their involvement matters. This means offering
examples of how close electoral races can be. . . . We might begin by
reminding our students of the very small margins by which critical elections
have been won and stressing the importance of their vote, whoever they
choose to vote for. That’s true both because of the immediate impact it
may have, and because their participation will set a pattern in their lives
going forward. We can talk about the  vote Florida total that handed
George Bush the presidency in , or the  votes by which Al
Franken won the  Minnesota Senate race. Students may assume that
their votes will be inconsequential, but multiplied by those of all their
peers, they matter, time and again.
Simple math proves how important every single vote is, according to
Loeb and his colleagues. This argument is diametrically opposed to the
calculations of political scientists: the chance your vote makes a difference
in large-scale elections is extremely small (cf. Downs ). The argument
of Anthony Downs and others is easy to grasp. Imagine: millions of voters
have to choose between two candidates, A and B. The single vote of one
voter will be decisive only if exactly half of the electorate opts for candi-
date A and the other half for candidate B. What are the chances of this
happening? Concrete examples of close electoral races, such as occurred
in Florida in , are highlighted by political scientists in order to
show that even in such situations the chance of a single vote being decisive
is extremely small: Florida was unprecedented, and in any case,  votes
are not equivalent to one vote. A single voter still would not have made a





























difference in Florida (Hardin ). Even if every vote counts, an individ-
ual vote almost never makes a signiﬁcant difference. An article in the
British Journal of Political Science recently began by asking, “Why do
people participate in mass politics, despite the obvious fact that any indi-
vidual’s actions have roughly zero chance of being decisive in any mean-
ingful political context?” (Gerber et al. , ). Perhaps part of the
answer is that voters have been misled by citizenship education into think-
ing that they can, individually, make a difference.
If it is questionable that a single vote is likely to inﬂuence a mass elec-
tion, education should not gloss over this fact. On the contrary, it deserves
to be discussed in school. This is more suited to education than is ignoring
the problem with an eye to promoting political efﬁcacy. At the same time,
young people can learn to ascertain and comprehend the reasons why
many people vote. These might include civic duty, a desire to gain
others’ esteem (Gerber et al. ), demonstrating commitment or
loyalty (Lupia and McCubbins ), “signaling goodness” (Nelson and
Greene ), setting a good example, believing that voting is not an indi-
vidual but a collective effort (Tuck ), or failing to recognize the min-
uscule chance that a single vote will matter (Bennett and Friedman ).
By examining and evaluating such reasons, students would improve their
ability to decide for themselves whether to vote.
∗ ∗ ∗
We have argued for a type of citizenship education that familiarizes stu-
dents with opinions about citizenship so they may ﬁnd their own way.
By way of contrast, consider the views expressed in “Democracy at
Risk” (Macedo ), a report written by a group of political scientists
and philosophers under the auspices of the APSA. It is an argument in
favor of institutional innovation aimed at enhancing civic engagement.
In the introduction to the report, the researchers explain why the pro-
motion of political and social participation is important: because the
quality and legitimacy of government are dependent on citizens’ partici-
pation, and because participation has a positive effect on the lives of indi-
vidual citizens as well as on community life (ibid., , ). The authors
recognize that there can be different opinions about whether levels of par-
ticipation are indeed worrisomely low or about how necessary or desirable
it is that participation be stimulated:





























Not all observers—not even all political scientists—agree with our basic
premise that citizen engagement is fundamental to healthy democratic
politics. Some are untroubled, even comforted, by low levels of citizenship
participation. There are, indeed, numerous arguments against our effort to
bolster citizen activity. (Ibid., )
The report then reconstructs and reviews several counterarguments
(Macedo , –). The thoughtful consideration of these counterar-
guments proves how reasonable the debate is, as it concerns matters on
which experts disagree on rational grounds. “Democracy at Risk” offers
a ﬁne characterization of the debate, but then goes on to disregard it:
“In the end, then, we stick to our guns: accountable, effective, and
legitimate government requires substantial civic and political engagement
by the people themselves” (ibid., ).
When it comes to the justiﬁcation of policy proposals or to determin-
ing policy, this approach is not necessarily problematic. If debate does not
conclude with a decision, nothing will ever happen. This also applies to
educational policy, not only at macro level (such as national policy) and
the meso level (school policy), but also at the micro level of deciding
how to teach. Ideally, a teacher will be familiar with ongoing debates
about, for instance, optimal classroom management and didactics, but in
the classroom will always have to choose a speciﬁc type of classroomman-
agement, a speciﬁc way of helping students to learn; otherwise, teaching
will not happen. The same applies to the choice of subject matter and
immediate objectives, to what teachers teach and students learn.
However, pragmatically motivated choices of subject matter and immedi-
ate objectives do have to take elementary educational principles into con-
sideration, among them the principle of non-indoctrination. If there are
substantial differences of perception and opinion regarding an issue, the
subject should be dealt with as an object to disagreement. No single
point of view may prescribe the content; the various perspectives
should be the content.
Thus, if there is difference of opinion and perception regarding the
value of social and political participation, as is recognized by the authors
of “Democracy at Risk,” these differences should be the subject of teach-
ing and learning in citizenship education. After all, students must be able
to decide for themselves which perspective should determine their actions
—a presumption that is not only fundamental to education, but to
democracy.
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